ACCEPT! Each type of evidence provides a unique opportunity to support its allegations. Similar evidence helps explain complicated ideas. They illustrate their importance by making comparisons with common sense. For example, to explain how computer viruses work, you can compare them to cold and flu viruses in humans. Or you can compare the results of a study with the results of a known study that is already known to the reader. Foundationalism: At least some logical theorems are known by non-inferential means. If you are using the testimony of a witness, introduce the expert whose testimony you are using. Let the reader know who they are. It creates credibility. Martin, B. Identification of logical proofs.
Synthesis 198, 9069-9095 (2021). doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02618-y Good writing uses different types of evidence to support different claims. Perhaps the most striking and philosophically interesting example of such a choice of theory is logic aimed not only at solving a particular technical or philosophical problem, but also at providing a general account of validity – what propositions flow from what. Several logics have been proposed as viable candidates for capturing validity: paraconsistent logics, intuitionistic logics, paracomplete logics, quantum logics and, of course, classical logic. Since these different logics allow for different rules of involvement, often with important implications, it is clearly important to know which logic we ultimately support. However, if we want to make a principled decision about which logic to support, we also need an understanding of what logical proofs are, which ultimately requires a theory of logical epistemology. The problem we currently face with such a theoretical choice is that a full account of how we know logical theorems and what exactly logical proofs are is not available. Anecdotal evidence is very useful at the beginning of a trial. Stories are great for grabbing the reader`s attention! This document has two main objectives. First, to demonstrate the fruitfulness of using logical practice to inform a theory of logical epistemology. There is no doubt that we are setting that objective for the document. Not only are there good independent reasons to believe that our theories of logical epistemology should consider logical practice based on precedents of science and mathematics, but even a brief examination of two dominant arguments in logic shows that we can learn much about the methodological assumptions of logicians from their arguments.
One hypothesis of this article is that we can learn more about logical epistemology by examining the actual practice of logicians. What justifies this hypothesis? The simple answer is that in the case of logic, the same considerations apply as in the empirical and mathematical sciences. It is generally accepted that the philosophy of science and its conclusions on scientific methodology and epistemology were in an unhealthy state until the actual practice of scientists was taken seriously (see, for example, Hacking 1983; Burian, 2001). One cannot expect to draw informed conclusions about how we become allowed to believe scientific theories without paying attention to how scientists justify their own theories (and experiment in general). The same is true for mathematics and, over the past 20 years, mathematical epistemology has become much more appreciated by examining in detail the practice of working mathematicians (see, for example, Giaquinto (2007), Van Bendegem (2003) and Van Kerkhove and Van Bendegem (2008)). The assumption behind all these uses of a practice-oriented approach to epistemology in a particular field is that scientists and mathematicians are generally very good at discerning what constitutes appropriate evidence for a theory in their field and what are plausible ways to justify a claim or theory. Logic is nothing special. His theories are continuous with science; His method continues with the scientific method. Logic is not a priori, and its truths are not analytical.
Logical theories are revisable, and when revised, they are revised on the same basis as scientific theories. These are the principles of anti-exceptionalism over logical theories. Footnote 7 Finally, what about logical abductivism? According to logical abductivism, we judge the adequacy of a theory by its ability to absorb relevant data, and we subsequently become entitled to believe in a logical theory by evaluating the degree to which each available theory corresponds to the data.
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